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CHRISTOPHER MANFREDI* 
Three high-profile government losses in the Supreme Court of Canada in late 2013 and early 
2014, combined with the government’s response to those losses, generated a narrative of 
an especially fractious relationship between Stephen Harper’s Conservative government 
and the Court. This article analyzes this narrative more rigorously by going beyond a mere 
tallying of government wins and losses in the Court. Specifically, it examines Charter-based 
invalidations of federal legislation since 2006, three critical reference opinions rendered at the 
government’s own request, and two key judgments delivered in the spring of 2015 concerning 
Aboriginal rights and the elimination of the long-gun registry. The article argues that the 
relationship between the Conservative government and the Court from 2006 to 2015 was 
much more complicated than the “fractious relationship” narrative would suggest. However, 
the Conservative government did adopt a more consistently confrontational approach in its 
legislative responses than its predecessors.
Trois défaites très médiatisées du gouvernement canadien devant la Cour suprême du 
Canada à la fin de 2013 et au début de 2014, combinées à la réaction du gouvernement, ont 
souligné la relation particulièrement houleuse qu’entretenait avec la Cour le gouvernement 
conservateur de Stephen Harper. Cet article analyse plus en profondeur cette relation en 
allant au-delà d’une simple comptabilité des victoires et des défaites du gouvernement 
devant cette cour. Il examine plus particulièrement l’invalidation de certaines lois fédérales 
depuis 2006 en raison de la Charte, trois renvois critiques rendus à la demande même du 
gouvernement et deux importants jugements rendus au printemps 2015 relativement aux 
droits autochtones et à l’élimination du registre des armes à feu. L’article prétend que la 
relation entre le gouvernement conservateur et la cour a été entre 2006 et 2015 beaucoup plus 
complexe que ne le suggérerait une simple « relation houleuse ». Toutefois, le gouvernement 
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conservateur a adopté dans ses réactions législatives une attitude plus conflictuelle que ses 
prédécesseurs.
ON 20 DECEMBER 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) unanimously 
declared three key sections of the Criminal Code that regulate prostitution 
unconstitutional under section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(“Charter”).1 Three months later, on 21 March 2014, the Court declared that 
the government’s nomination of a federal court judge, Justice Marc Nadon, to 
fill a Quebec vacancy on the Court violated the Supreme Court Act and that 
amending the Act to change the Court’s composition could only be achieved 
through constitutional amendment.2 Just over a month after that judgment, the 
Court rejected the government’s proposed legislation for reforming the term of 
Senators and the manner in which they are appointed.3 These three high-profile 
government losses in the SCC generated a growing narrative of an especially 
fractious relationship between the Conservative government of Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper and the SCC.
The narrative probably originated earlier,4 but it reached a crescendo in 2014 
and 2015. Writing in the Globe and Mail in 2014, Lawrence Martin described 
the Court as having become, not by design but in effect, “the Official Opposition 
in Ottawa.”5 Similarly, Vanessa Naughton described a “contentious relationship” 
1. Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 SCR 1101 [Bedford].
2. Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21, [2014] 1 SCR 433 [Supreme 
Court Act Reference]. The judgment effectively entrenched the Supreme Court Act in 
the Constitution.
3. Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 SCR 704 [Senate Reform Reference].
4. See e.g. Andrew Stobo Sniderman, “Harper v. The Judges,” Macleans (21 August 2012), 
online: <www.macleans.ca/news/canada/harper-v-the-judges>.
5. “The Supreme Court is Harper’s real Opposition,” The Globe and Mail (1 July 2014), online: 
<www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/the-supreme-court-is-harpers-real-opposition/
article19395285>.
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beset by “flare-ups between the Harper government and the top court … that 
have put a wrench in the Conservative government’s plans.”6 The narrative 
continued into 2015. As Tristin Hopper wrote in the National Post, “In one of 
the starkest examples in Canadian history of two branches of government openly 
turning against one another, the red robed members [of the] Supreme Court of 
Canada have spent months systematically shooting down virtually every issue the 
Conservatives hold dear.”7 Hopper’s National Post colleague, Joseph Brean, made 
a similar point five weeks later, suggesting that a series of losses “has solidified an 
image of the court as the government’s nemesis, with McLachlin as its fearless, 
indomitable leader.”8 As Osgoode Hall Law School Dean Lorne Sossin wrote 
in The Walrus, rulings against the federal government “have become stylized as 
Harper v. the Court.”9
The government’s own reaction to some of these losses added plausibility 
to the narrative and suggested that any animosity might be mutual. A few 
days after the Court’s rejection of Harper’s Senate reform plan, showing his 
frustration with the Court’s judgments during the previous few months, 
the Prime Minister suggested that the Chief Justice had acted improperly by 
having attempted to contact him about the Nadon appointment.10 The Prime 
Minister’s remarks, and the Chief Justice’s public response, were unprecedented 
in Canadian executive-judicial relations.11 The government responded to its loss 
6. “Harper vs the Supreme Court of Canada,” Global News (12 May 2014), online: 
<globalnews.ca/news/1325937/harper-vs-the-supreme-court-of-canada>.
7. “A scorecard of the Harper government’s wins and losses at the Supreme Court of 
Canada,” National Post (15 April 2015), online: <news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/
scoc-harper-gov-scorecard-741324>.
8. “‘Conscious objectivity’: That’s how the chief justice defines the top court’s role. Harper 
might beg to differ,” National Post (23 May 2015), online: <news.nationalpost.com/news/
canada/conscious-objectivity-thats-how-the-chief-justice-defines-the-top-courts-role-harper-
might-beg-to-differ>.
9. “Court Dismissed,” The Walrus (January/February 2015), online: <www.thewalrus.ca/
court-dismissed>.
10. Leslie MacKinnon, “Beverley McLachlin, PMO give duelling statements on 
Nadon appointment fight,” CBC News (1 May 2014), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/
politics/beverley-mclachlin-pmo-give-duelling-statements-on-nadon-appointment-
fight-1.2628563>. This was in stark contrast to Harper’s initial measured reaction 
to the Nadon ruling on 25 March 2014, in which he stated that the government 
would respect both the letter and spirit of the decision. See e.g. Sean Fine & Steven 
Chase, “Harper says he will ‘respect’ Supreme Court’s blocking of Nadon,” The Globe 
and Mail (25 March 2014), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/
harper-says-he-will-respect-supreme-courts-blocking-of-nadon/article17661060>.
11. Supreme Court of Canada, News Release (2 May 2014), online: <scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/
news/en/4602/1/document.do>.
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in the prostitution case by proposing Bill C-36,12 which retained the invalidated 
Criminal Code provisions with some amendments but also established two new 
criminal offences related to prostitution.13 Similarly, it responded to an earlier 
loss concerning safe intravenous drug injection sites with Bill C-2, which would 
have amended section 56 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to require 
extensive submissions by provincial, local, and law enforcement authorities, 
among others, before the Minister could grant an exemption.14
The purpose of this article is to analyze this narrative more rigorously by 
going beyond a mere tallying of government wins and losses in the Court. 
Indeed, two features of constitutional litigation make the relationship between 
a government and the SCC more difficult to determine than it might otherwise 
appear. First, with the notable exceptions of reference cases (where a government 
explicitly seeks a constitutional opinion from the Court) and some federalism 
cases (where one government directly challenges the actions of another), 
governments are usually involuntary participants in constitutional litigation. This 
is particularly true in cases involving the Charter, where governments are forced 
to defend legislative and executive action against challenges from individuals 
and groups. Second, governments often find themselves defending legislation 
enacted by previous governments. Of course, governments may not always view 
this negatively: They may disagree with the statute under review, whatever its 
12. An Act to amend the Criminal Code in response to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in 
Attorney General of Canada v Bedford and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 2nd 
Sess, 41st Parl, 2014.
13. For a good summary and analysis of Bill C-36, see Library of Parliament, Bill C 36: An Act 
to amend the Criminal Code in response to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Attorney 
General of Canada v Bedford and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, by Lyne 
Casavant & Dominque Valiquet (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 18 July 2014), online: 
<www.lop.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/LegislativeSummaries/41/2/c36-e.pdf>. Bill C-36 
received Royal Assent on 6 November 2014. However, the new Minister of Justice has been 
mandated to review all changes to the criminal justice system and sentencing reforms enacted 
over the past decade. See Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau, “Minister of Justice and 
Attorney General of Canada Mandate Letter,” online: <pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-justice-and-
attorney-general-canada-mandate-letter> [Mandate Letter].
14. Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 SCR 
134 [PHS]. This case is discussed at length in Part I, below. For more information on Bill 
C-2, see Library of Parliament, Bill C-2: An Act to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances 
Act, by Martha Butler & Karin Phillips (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 30 March 2015), 
online: <www.lop.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/LegislativeSummaries/41/2/c2-e.pdf>. Bill C-2 
received Royal Assent on 18 June 2015. However, the new Minister of Justice has been 
mandated to review all changes to the criminal justice system and sentencing reforms enacted 
over the past decade. See Mandate Letter, supra note 13.
MANFREDI, CONSERVATIVES, THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA, AND THE CONSTITUTION 955
provenance, and thus welcome judicial intervention against it. Nevertheless, the 
fact that governments are often parties to disputes over legislation or policies 
for which they were not responsible for enacting makes case outcomes a poor 
measure of government-judicial relations.
The article presents its analysis in three parts. First, it examines Charter-based 
invalidations of federal legislation by the SCC since 2006. Second, it examines 
three critical reference opinions rendered by the Court at the government’s own 
request, each of which delivered a result contrary to the government’s wishes. 
Third, the article examines two key judgments delivered in the spring of 2015 
concerning Aboriginal rights and the elimination of the long-gun registry.
I. THE CONSERVATIVES, THE SCC, AND THE CHARTER
The relationship between Canadian conservatism and the Charter has always 
been ambivalent. On the one hand, conservatives were among the most vocal, if 
not sole, opponents of adopting the Charter, and conservative scholars have been 
strong critics of the Charter and its judicial application.15 On the other hand, 
conservative groups have actively participated in Charter litigation, including 
as initiators of litigation.16 The Reform Party—the precursor to the present-day 
Conservative Party—accepted the principle of a judicially enforceable Charter 
in its 1996 policy platform but advocated narrower definitions of equality rights 
and entrenchment of property and contract rights in the Charter.17 Indeed, to 
the extent that conservatism advocates limited government, judicial enforcement 
of constitutional rights against governments overreaching is an important means 
15. See FL Morton & Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Peterborough, 
Ont: Broadview Press, 2000); Ian Brodie, Friends of the Court: The Privileging of Interest 
Group Litigants in Canada (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002); Rory 
Leishman, Against Judicial Activism: The Decline of Freedom and Democracy in Canada 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006).  Some commentators would include 
me in this group. See Christopher P Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and 
the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism, 2nd ed (Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press 
Canada, 2001). 
16. See Dennis R Hoover & Kevin R den Dulk, “Christian Conservatives Go to Court: Religion 
and Legal Mobilization in the United States and Canada” (2004) 25:1 Int’l Pol Sci Rev 9; 
Avril Allen, “An Analysis of Interest Group Litigation in Canada,” (Presentation, October 
2007) [on file with author]. 
17. Reform Party of Canada, “A Fresh Start for Canadians: Blue Book: 1996-1997 Principles 
& Policies of the Reform Party of Canada” (1996) at 22-23, online: POLTEXT Electronic 
Manifestos Canada <www.poltext.org/sites/poltext.org/files/plateformes/can1996r_plt_
en_12072011_124840.pdf>.
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to that end. Nevertheless, invalidation of federal legislation and other policy 
initiatives by the SCC on Charter grounds during the Harper government is a 
key element in the development of the “fractious relationship” narrative.
The first step in understanding this aspect of the Conservative government’s 
relationship to the SCC under the Charter is to step back and look at the relationship 
between the Court and all post-Charter governments. The post-Charter era has 
been one of remarkably low turnover among governments in Canada. Indeed, 
excluding the new Liberal government elected in October 2015, there have only 
been three federal governments during this period: the Progressive Conservative 
government (1984–1993) (“PC”), the Liberal government (1993–2006) 
(“LIB2”), and the Conservative Party government (2006–2015) (“CPC”). The 
Charter litigation experience of these governments before the SCC illustrates the 
point made above that governments often find themselves engaged in litigation 
over a previous government’s actions. 
For this article, I analyzed all SCC decisions issued up to 31 October 2015 
in which the Court invalidated federal government action under the Charter. 
Table 1 shows each government’s total losses and loss rate per year in office for 
each of three categories of cases: cases in which the government was the enactor 
of the invalidated measure, cases in which the government was the defender of 
the invalidated measure, and cases in which the government was both the enactor 
and defender of the invalidated measure.18 During this period, these three 
governments were on the losing side in 52 cases in which the Court declared 
legislation (or other government action) unconstitutional under the Charter.19 
However, only 6 of those cases involved invalidation of their own legislation. 
For example, although the PC government found itself on the losing side in 
22 Charter cases, 21 of those losses came in cases defending legislation enacted 
by previous governments, including the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau 
(1968–1979, 1980–1984) (“LIB1”). Similarly, of the LIB2 government’s 17 
Charter losses, 15 involved legislation passed by previous governments. Finally, 
9 of the 12 CPC government’s losses in Charter litigation involved legislation 
enacted by predecessor governments.
18. For a full list of all SCC nullifications of federal statutes on Charter grounds from 
1984–2015, which constitute the data set for Table 1, see Appendix, below.
19. This figure includes all invalidations from 1984 until October 2015. Recently, on 31 July 
2015, the Court issued its judgment in Guindon v Canada, in which a four-to-three majority 
exercised its discretion to decide a constitutional question without notice and resolved the 
question in the government’s favour. The dissent argued that the question should not have 
been decided, which may be an example of what political scientists call a “strategic denial.” 
See Guindon v Canada, 2015 SCC 41, 387 DLR (4th) 228.
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The frequency with which the Harper government had its legislation 
invalidated by the Court on Charter grounds (0.33 per year in office) compares 
quite favourably to its two predecessor governments (1.00 for the PC government 
and 0.46 for the LIB2 government). Moreover, the rate at which the CPC 
government lost Charter cases as the defending government is almost the lowest 
of the three governments to date (1.33 compared to 2.56 and 1.31).  
TABLE 1: INVALIDATIONS BY ENACTING AND DEFENDING GOVERNMENT
Government
Period in 
Office
Invalidated 
as  
Enactor
Rate 
Per 
Year in 
Office
Invalidated 
as  
Defender
Rate Per 
Year in 
Office
Invalidated 
as Enactor 
and 
Defender
Rate 
Per 
Year in 
Office
LIB1 1968–1979, 1980–1984 12 0.80 1 0.07 0 0.00
PC 1984–1993 9 1.00 22 2.56 1 0.11
LIB2 1993–2006 6 0.46 17 1.31 2 0.15
CPC 2006–2015 3 0.33 12 1.33 3 0.33
Invalidations of LIB1 legislation under the PC government included important 
and high-profile legislation involving refugee determination proceedings (Singh),20 
abortion regulation (Morgentaler),21 sexual assault (Seaboyer),22 and employment 
insurance (Schachter).23 Although the PC government did not precipitate these 
legal conflicts, it had to defend the legislation and deal with the political and 
policy impact of the invalidations. The LIB1 statutes invalidated under the LIB2 
government were lower profile, although one case involved rules governing the 
acquisition of citizenship (Benner).24 Five of the PC government’s legislative 
provisions were invalidated under the LIB2 government, including important 
20. Singh v Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 SCR 177, 17 DLR (4th) 422.
21. R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30, 63 OR (2d) 281 [Morgentaler]. 
22. R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme, [1991] 2 SCR 577, 4 OR (3d) 383. 
23. Schachter v Canada, [1992] 2 SCR 679, 93 DLR (4th) 1.
24. Benner v Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 SCR 358, 145 DLR (4th) 259.
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legislation involving tobacco advertising and labelling (RJR-Macdonald)25 and 
inmate voting rights (Sauvé).26 Each of these instances illustrates the general 
point suggested by the aggregate data in Table 1: A government’s losses in Charter 
litigation may tell us very little about the relationship between that government 
and the Court precisely because the loss pertained to legislation enacted by a 
previous government.
A more detailed examination of the CPC government’s experience 
before the Court in Charter cases indicates that its experience does not differ 
markedly from that of its predecessor governments. The complicated nature of 
the Court-government relationship is apparent in Canada (Attorney General) v 
Hislop, the first judgment in which the SCC invalidated federal legislation after 
the CPC government came to power.27 At issue in Hislop were provisions of the 
Canada Pension Plan that extended survivorship pensions to same-sex partners 
while simultaneously imposing temporal limits on eligibility for the benefit. In 
its judgment delivered on 1 March 2007, the Court unanimously held that the 
temporal eligibility limit infringed the right to equality on the grounds of sexual 
orientation and that the infringement could not be saved by section 1 of the 
Charter. The Court declared the relevant sections of the Canada Pension Plan Act 
unconstitutional, thereby extending the benefit to previously ineligible survivors.
At first glance, Hislop seems to support the narrative of a Court hostile to the 
ideological and policy preferences of the CPC government, which—consistent 
with socially conservative elements of its program—defended legislation 
(unsuccessfully) against an equality rights claim based on sexual orientation. The 
details of the litigation, however, do not support this simple narrative. First, the 
provisions challenged in Hislop had been enacted by the LIB2 government in 
2000 as part of its legislative response to the Court’s judgment in M v H.28 Second, 
judicial proceedings began during that same government, and the first judicial 
decision was rendered in 2003.29 Third, the decision to appeal the government’s 
losses in the lower courts was also made by the LIB2 government.30 Only the 
oral argument, held on 16 May 2006, just over three months after the change in 
government, might be attributed to the CPC government. To be sure, the federal 
25. RJR-MacDonald v Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 SCR 199, 127 DLR (4th) 1. 
26. Sauvé v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 2002 SCC 68, [2002] 3 SCR 519 [Sauvé]. Readers 
should note that I was an expert for the Government of Canada in Sauvé.
27. 2007 SCC 10, [2007] 1 SCR 429 [Hislop].
28. [1999] 2 SCR 3, 43 OR (3d) 254.
29. Hislop v Canada (Attorney General) (2003), 234 DLR (4th) 465, 50 RFL (5th) 
26 (Ont Sup Ct).
30. Hislop v Canada (Attorney General) (2004), 73 OR (3d) 641, 246 DLR (4th) 644 (CA).
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government’s position in Hislop was likely consistent with the CPC government’s 
own policy, but it was not uniquely consistent with that government’s policy. The 
predecessor LIB2 government had enacted the impugned legislation, defended 
it before lower courts, and mostly constructed the case presented to the SCC.
The same dynamic is evident in perhaps the CPC government’s highest-profile 
early loss before the Court: Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration).31 
Like Hislop, Charkaoui engaged a core issue for the CPC government: national 
security, especially in the context of anti-terrorism measures. At issue was the 
constitutionality of procedures under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
(“IRPA”) for issuing and determining the reasonableness of security certificates 
and for reviewing detention under those certificates. A unanimous judgment 
of the Court, delivered by Chief Justice McLachlin, declared that the relevant 
provisions of the IRPA infringed sections 7, 9, and 10(c) of the Charter. The 
Court declared the provisions of no force or effect but suspended the declaration 
of invalidity for one year to give the government an opportunity to revise the 
legislation.32 While this result was clearly not welcomed by the CPC government, 
it cannot be characterized as a repudiation of its policy. The provisions in question 
had been enacted in 2001 by the Chrétien government (the LIB2 government), 
and the lower court proceedings began more than a year before the CPC 
government came to power. As in Hislop, the CPC government became engaged 
only shortly before oral argument occurred in June 2006.
The related odyssey of Omar Khadr bears similar characteristics.33 US forces 
took Khadr prisoner in Afghanistan in 2002 at the age of fifteen, transferred him 
to Guantanamo Bay, and charged him with murder and other terrorism-related 
offences.34 In 2003, Canadian officials questioned him at Guantanamo Bay and 
shared the results of those interviews with US officials.35 In 2008, following divided 
judgments by the Federal Court trial and appellate divisions, the SCC held that 
the Crown had an obligation under section 7 of the Charter, as interpreted in R 
v Stinchcombe,36 to disclose the records of those interviews and the information 
communicated to US authorities. In 2010, the Court further found that Khadr’s 
Charter rights had been violated by US interrogation techniques in 2003 and 
31. 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 SCR 350 [Charkaoui].
32. Ibid at paras 139-40.
33. Canada (Justice) v Khadr, 2008 SCC 28, [2008] 2 SCR 125 [Khadr]; Canada (Prime 
Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 SCR 44 [Khadr, 2010]; Bowden Institution v 
Khadr, 2015 SCC 26, 322 CCC (3d) 465 [Khadr, 2015].
34. Khadr, 2010, supra note 33 at paras 3-4.
35. Ibid at para 5.
36. [1991] 3 SCR 326, 120 AR 161.
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2004 and that he was entitled to a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter. 
However, the Court refused to order the remedy sought by Khadr—an order that 
Canada request his repatriation from Guantanamo Bay—and instead found that 
the appropriate remedy was a declaration that Khadr’s rights had been violated.37 
The Court left it to the government to determine how best to respond “in light 
of current information, its responsibility over foreign affairs, and the Charter.”38 
Finally, in 2015, the Court delivered an oral judgment from the bench affirming 
the Alberta Court of Appeal judgment that Khadr’s sentence for his offences was 
a youth sentence to be served in a provincial institution.39 
As in Charkaoui, the Khadr litigation spanned both the LIB2 and CPC 
governments. Indeed, the constitutional violations identified by the Court 
in 2008 and 2010 all occurred under the LIB2 government. To be sure, the 
CPC government took the hardest line possible in the Khadr litigation, and its 
(non-)response to the Court’s 2010 declaration demonstrated its disagreement 
with how the Court had handled the case. In that sense, the Court’s summary 
dismissal of the CPC government’s argument in 2015 might be understood as 
a clear rebuke of the government’s position. Thus, while the CPC government 
was not responsible for the initial violation of Khadr’s Charter rights, it failed to 
mitigate the harm flowing from those violations to the Court’s satisfaction.  
A similar dynamic is evident in the third judicial invalidation that occurred 
during the CPC government: R v DB in 2008.40 At issue in DB were provisions 
of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (“YCJA”) enacted by the LIB2 government in 
2002 to create a category of “presumptive offences” under which Youth Court 
judges must impose adult sentences unless the young person demonstrates that 
a youth sentence would be sufficient to hold him or her accountable for the 
criminal act. This presumption of an adult sentence for these offences (murder, 
attempted murder, manslaughter, aggravated sexual assault, and “serious violent 
offences”) reversed the standard procedure in which the Crown bears the onus of 
showing that the young person has lost the entitlement to a youth sentence. The 
provisions under review also reversed the onus with respect to publication bans 
in these cases by requiring youths to demonstrate why they should continue to be 
protected by the publication ban otherwise required by the YCJA. A five-justice 
majority of the Court held that these provisions infringed the right to liberty 
protected by section 7 of the Charter in a manner inconsistent with the principles 
37. Khadr, 2010, supra note 33 at paras 41-47.
38. Ibid at para 39.
39. Khadr, 2015, supra note 33.
40. 2008 SCC 25, [2008] 2 SCR 3 [DB].
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of fundamental justice and that they could not be justified as a reasonable limit. 
It therefore rejected the Crown’s appeal to set aside the youth sentence.41
It should be obvious that the outcome in DB was disappointing to the CPC 
government, but not because it interfered with an element of its own criminal 
and youth justice policy. The law under review predated the CPC government by 
four years,42 the offense that precipitated D.B.’s prosecution occurred three years 
before the CPC’s election, and the trial court judgment was rendered two years 
earlier.43 The CPC government first became involved at the provincial appellate 
court level44 but took clear ownership of the issue by pursuing the appeal to the 
SCC. In this sense, the CPC government was deeply invested in defending the 
constitutionality of the provisions even if it had not been directly responsible for 
enacting them.45 From this perspective, there is the hint of a conflict between 
the government and the Court, although the closeness of the judgment does not 
indicate a sharp conflict.46
Two cases decided early in 2015 display similar characteristics. At issue 
in Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada was the 
constitutionality of provisions of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and 
Terrorist Financing Act as they applied to the legal profession.47 First enacted 
under the LIB2 government, the statute imposes various obligations on “financial 
intermediaries,” including legal professionals, to record and retain information 
about financial transactions.48 It also established search and seizure powers, 
although with limitations related to material covered by solicitor-client privilege. 
Although it found that the qualified search and seizure provisions were rationally 
connected to a pressing and substantial legislative objective, the Court nevertheless 
agreed with the Federation of Canadian Law Societies that the provisions were 
overly restrictive of the section 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and 
seizure when applied to the legal profession. The Court thus ordered that the 
41. Interestingly, although the four dissenting justices disagreed with the majority’s constitutional 
reasoning, they nevertheless agreed that the youth sentence was reasonable and should not be 
interfered with. See ibid at para 192.
42. Youth Criminal Justice Act, SC 2002, c 1.
43. R v DB, 72 OR (3d) 605, 190 CCC (3d) 383 (Sup Ct).
44. R v KDT, 2006 BCCA 60, 206 CCC (3d) 44.
45. Although not responsible for enacting the provisions, they were partly the product of 
political pressure exerted by the CPC’s precursors, the Reform Party and Canadian Alliance, 
when in opposition. 
46. Note that Justice Marshall Rothstein, the first—and at that point, only—justice appointed 
by the CPC government, joined the dissenting judgment.
47. 2015 SCC 7, [2015] 1 SCR 401 [Federation of Law Societies of Canada].
48. Ibid at para 2.
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impugned provisions be “read down” to exclude legal professionals from their 
scope of operation, leaving the statute otherwise intact.49
While this judgment might be perceived as another judicial rejection of the 
CPC government’s anti-terrorism policies, that perception would be overbroad. 
As in DB, the basic legislative framework originated with another government, 
and while the CPC government vigorously defended the provisions, the judgment 
cannot be characterized as a direct repudiation of its policy agenda. Moreover, 
although clearly a government loss, Federation of Law Societies of Canada was 
relatively mild in its invalidation of the statute. The Court accepted the general 
principle underlying the legislation and even accepted that its main provisions 
were legitimately applied to a wide variety of professions. The Court drew the 
line at the legal profession, and in this sense, the judgment might be understood 
not so much as rejecting a particular policy orientation towards crime prevention 
but as protecting the profession of which the Court is an essential component.
Close analysis of another of the government’s 2015 losses also fails to support 
the narrative of high Court-government hostility. In Mounted Police Association 
of Ontario v Canada (Attorney General), the Court held that excluding Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”) members from the public service labour 
relations regime and imposing a non-unionized regime on them violated their 
section 2 Charter right to freedom of association.50 Although the litigation leading 
to MPAO began shortly after the CPC government’s election, the regulations and 
statutes under review dated back to 1988 and 2003, respectively.51 Moreover, 
MPAO was one of two cases decided in a span of two weeks that extended Charter 
rights to organized labour in novel ways, suggesting that it was not so much 
directed against the federal government of the day but against a general trend 
in labour regulation.52 In addition, the Court denied a constitutional challenge 
against wage rollbacks imposed on RCMP members in 2009.53 To some degree, 
the CPC government was a bystander in the Court’s reconsideration of its own 
approach to labour-management relations.
One can sense a similar, if more pronounced, dynamic at work in the Court’s 
unanimous judgment in Carter v Canada (Attorney General) in 2015.54 In Carter, 
the Court reconsidered its narrow 1993 decision upholding the constitutionality 
49. Ibid at para 67.
50. 2015 SCC 1, [2015] 1 SCR 3 [MPAO].
51. Royal Canadian Mounted Police Regulations, 1988, SOR/88-361, s 96; Public Service Labour 
Relations Act, SC 2003, c 22, s 2(1).
52. See also Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4, [2015] 1 SCR 245.
53. Meredith v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 2 at paras 12-14, [2015] 1 SCR 125.
54. 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331 [Carter].
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of the Criminal Code’s prohibition against assisted suicide.55 The opening 
paragraphs of this “By the Court” judgment, which is a device often used in 
deeply controversial cases where the Court wants to put its full institutional 
weight behind its judgment, are powerful. The Court characterizes the criminal 
prohibition as condemning “people who are grievously and irremediably ill … 
to a life of severe and intolerable suffering.”56 Such persons face a cruel choice: 
“take [their] own life prematurely, often by violent or dangerous means,” or suffer 
until dying from natural causes.57 In the Court’s view, the question before it was 
whether a law that forces such a choice violates the rights under section 7 of 
the Charter to life, liberty, and security of the person. The Court recognized the 
“competing values of great importance” at the heart of this question: “On the one 
hand stands the autonomy and dignity of a competent adult who seeks death as 
a response to a grievous and irremediable medical condition. On the other stands 
the sanctity of life and the need to protect the vulnerable.”58
The Court agreed with the trial judge that the prohibition against assisted 
suicide violates the section 7 rights of competent adults. The Court further 
agreed that, during the two decades since its earlier decision, experiences in other 
jurisdictions demonstrated that it is possible to design “a properly administered 
regulatory regime … capable of protecting the vulnerable from abuse or error.”59 
It therefore concluded “that the prohibition on physician-assisted dying is void 
insofar as it deprives a competent adult of such assistance where (1) the person 
affected clearly consents to the termination of life; and (2) the person has a 
grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an illness, disease, or 
disability) that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in 
the circumstances of his or her condition.”60 The Court suspended the declaration 
of invalidity for twelve months to provide Parliament an opportunity to design a 
regulatory regime that respects individual autonomy and dignity while protecting 
the vulnerable.61
The relationship of Carter to the CPC government is analogous to the 
relationship of Morgentaler to the PC government. Both cases involved Criminal 
Code provisions regulating individuals’ control over their own bodies and both 
sets of provisions engaged competing principles of social morality. Moreover, 
55. Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 SCR 519, 82 BCLR (2d) 273.
56. Carter, supra note 54 at para 1.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid at para 2.
59. Ibid at para 3.
60. Ibid at paras 4, 127.
61. Ibid at para 128.
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neither government was responsible for the policy status quo overturned by the 
Court, yet each government inherited the challenge of developing a new policy 
regime not easily reconcilable with its median ideological position. However, 
in contrast to Morgentaler, the Carter Court provided some relatively specific 
guidelines for designing this new regime. The first guideline can be found in 
the Court’s characterization of the Criminal Code provisions as prohibiting 
“physician-assisted” suicide when those provisions, in fact, established an 
indictable offence for “everyone who aids or abets a person in committing 
suicide.”62 Consequently, in voiding this provision, the Court was effectively 
removing criminal liability from anyone who assists someone to commit suicide. 
By characterizing its judgment as decriminalizing physician-assisted suicide rather 
than assisted suicide more generally, the Court signalled that a policy regime 
in which only physicians may provide assistance would be constitutionally 
permissible, thereby narrowing the scope of its judgment to some degree.
The other guidelines are more explicit in the Court’s reference to (1) 
competent adults who (2) clearly consent to the termination of life because 
of (3) a grievous and irremediable medical condition that (4) causes enduring 
and intolerable suffering. The Court further clarified that individuals could not 
be required to undertake treatments unacceptable to them. The challenge for 
the CPC government in response to Carter was to design a policy regime that 
includes a process to determine when these conditions have been met. One can 
envision a policy response in which the invalidated provisions of the Criminal 
Code remain intact but with an exemption for physicians where a third party has 
certified that the conditions of competence, consent, gravity or incurability, and 
enduring or intolerable suffering have been met. This is, in fact, close to what is 
found in Quebec’s Bill 52,63 where patients meeting conditions similar to those 
defined in Carter may request medical aid in dying from a physician who must, 
in addition to meeting other obligations under Bill 52, obtain the opinion of a 
second independent physician before administering the necessary aid. Whatever 
the process, it is likely to allow variance both across and within provinces as well 
as to create the possibility of delays that would have the effect of prolonging 
suffering. Ironically, in this situation, the policy regime would be vulnerable to 
the same constitutional attack that succeeded in invalidating the Criminal Code’s 
therapeutic abortion provisions in Morgentaler.
The government’s response to Carter was delayed but arguably moderate. 
On 17 July 2015, it announced the establishment of an external panel to review 
62. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 14, 241(b).
63. An Act respecting end-of-life care, 1st Sess, 40th Leg, Quebec, 2013.
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options for responding to the judgment. With a requirement to report by late 
fall 2015, the three-person panel’s mandate was to consult with the public and 
key stakeholders, especially the interveners in Carter.64 Although there was some 
criticism of the panel’s composition,65 this response to Carter is qualitatively 
different from the responses to the two cases noted in the introduction and now 
discussed below.
If any judgments are consistent with the narrative of conflict between the 
Court and the CPC government, they are: PHS (2011),66 Bedford (2013),67 
and R v Nur (2015).68 At issue in PHS was the constitutionality of the exercise 
of ministerial discretion under the 1996 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
(“CDSA”).69 Section 56 of the CDSA granted the federal Minister of Health the 
authority to grant an exemption from its application to persons or controlled 
substances where “in the opinion of the Minister, the exemption is necessary 
for a medical or scientific purpose or is otherwise in the public interest.”70 
In 2003, the LIB2 Minister of Health granted an exemption to PHS Community 
Services to operate Insite, a supervised safe injection site for intravenous drug 
users.71 The purpose of the exemption was to reduce the incidence of HIV/AIDS 
and hepatitis C among this population while assisting its members to end their 
dependency on drugs.72 In 2006 and 2007, the CPC Minister granted temporary 
extensions to the exemption, but in 2008, the Minister denied an application to 
extend the original exemption.73
PHS Community Services sought to pre-empt the Minister’s denial by 
bringing an action before British Columbia courts, arguing that denial of the 
exemption would infringe rights protected under section 7 of the Charter in 
64. Department of Justice Canada, “Government of Canada Establishes External Panel on 
options for a legislative response to Carter v. Canada” (News Release) (17 July 2015), online: 
<news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1002949>. The CPC government was defeated before the 
panel completed its consultations or submitted its final report. The future of this panel is, of 
course, uncertain since the change in government.
65. See e.g. Laura Payton, “Doctor-assisted suicide panel includes original Crown 
witnesses” CBC News (17 July 2015), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
doctor-assisted-suicide-panel-includes-original-crown-witnesses-1.3157361>.
66. PHS, supra note 14. 
67. Bedford, supra note 1. 
68. 2015 SCC 15, 385 DLR (4th) 1 [Nur].
69. SC 1996, c 19, ss 4(1), 5(1), 56 [CDSA].
70. PHS, supra note 14 at para 39.
71. Ibid at para 16.
72. Ibid at para 1. 
73. Ibid at paras 121-22.
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a manner inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice.74 In 2011, a 
unanimous SCC, including two justices appointed by the CPC government, 
declared under the Chief Justice’s name that the Minister’s failure to grant an 
exemption violated the claimants’ rights to life, liberty, and security of the person 
and contravened the principles of fundamental justice. According to the Court, 
removal of the exemption infringed these rights by making it impossible for Insite 
clients to access the “lifesaving and health-protecting services” offered at the 
facility.75 The Court further declared that, by refusing to exercise his discretion 
under section 56 of the CDSA, the Minister was acting in a way that caused the 
CDSA to be applied in an arbitrary, overly broad, and grossly disproportionate 
manner: arbitrary because it produced a result directly contrary to the CDSA’s 
purpose by undermining rather than protecting public health and safety, and 
grossly disproportionate because it increased the risk of death and disease among 
intravenous drug users without generating any public policy benefit for Canada.76
Not only was the Court unambiguous in rebuking the Minister’s decision, 
it also imposed an unusually interventionist remedy. The Court determined that 
the special circumstance of the case merited a writ of mandamus, which is an 
order for a government official to take specific action. The Court thus ordered 
the Minister to grant an immediate exemption under section 56, and it further 
defined the Minister’s ongoing constitutional obligations in exercising discretion 
under the CDSA in a way that makes it virtually impossible to deny future 
applications for exemptions from Insite or any other supervised injection site 
like it.77 In PHS, the Court chastised the CPC government for ignoring evidence 
“on which successive federal Ministers have relied in granting exemption orders 
over almost five years”78 and acted to protect the policy status quo from a 
change in government.
A similar conflict is evident in Bedford. At issue was whether criminal 
prohibitions against keeping or being in a “bawdy house,” living on the avails of 
prostitution, and communicating for the purposes of prostitution infringe the 
74. There was also a division of powers challenge to the legislation, but the Court rejected it 
relatively summarily. See ibid at para 73.
75. Ibid at para 92.
76. Ibid at paras 129-33.
77. Ibid at paras 150-52.
78. Ibid at para 131.
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constitutional right to security of the person under section 7 of the Charter.79 
The Court unanimously held that the impugned provisions did infringe section 
7 by increasing the risk that prostitutes would become victims of violence 
while engaging in an activity—exchanging sex for money—that is not itself 
prohibited.80 The Court further held that the infringement was inconsistent with 
the principles of fundamental justice because the impugned provisions were, as 
in PHS, arbitrary, overbroad, and grossly disproportionate to their objectives. 
Technically a criminal law case, the list of non-governmental interveners in the 
case illustrates the extent to which Bedford was also a clash between differing 
views of social policy and moral values. Indeed, the Court recognized this in 
describing the regulation of prostitution as a “complex and delicate matter”81 
for which the criminal law might simply be too blunt a regulatory instrument. 
Although the provisions declared unconstitutional in Bedford dated back to 
the nineteenth century and had been endorsed by a previous government in a 
consolidation of the Criminal Code almost thirty years earlier, it was clear that 
the CPC government preferred to continue regulating prostitution through 
the Criminal Code.
In April 2015, the Court issued a judgment that provides perhaps the closest 
fit with the “fractious relationship” narrative of all of the post-2006 government 
losses under the Charter. At issue in Nur was the constitutionality of a five-year 
mandatory minimum sentence for firearm-related offences that the CPC 
government had enacted in 2012. In a six-to-three judgment, with the Chief 
Justice writing for the majority, the Court held that this mandatory minimum 
constitutes an unjustified infringement of the right not to be subjected to cruel 
and unusual punishment as guaranteed by section 12 of the Charter. However, 
although the majority concluded that the five-year mandatory minimum might 
foreseeably be grossly disproportionate if applied to other offenders, it conceded 
that it was not grossly disproportionate as applied to the specific offenders 
involved in the appeal. Consequently, the majority invalidated the provision 
but upheld the sentences applied both to Nur and the other offender involved 
in the appeal.82
79. This was the second time the Court had been asked to review the constitutionality of these 
provisions under the Charter. The constitutional questions in 1990 were different, however, 
since they involved freedom of expression under section 2 and liberty interests under section 
7. See Reference re ss 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man), [1990] 1 SCR 1123, 
56 CCC (3d) 65.
80. Bedford, supra note 1 at paras 5, 88-89.
81. Ibid at para 165.
82. Nur, supra note 68 at paras 119-20.
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In reaching her judgment, the Chief Justice concentrated on the principle 
of proportionality in sentencing, which she defined as “a highly individualized 
exercise, tailored to the gravity of the offence, the blameworthiness of the 
offender, and the harm caused by the crime.”83 Mandatory minimum sentences, 
she argued, threaten this principle due to their emphasis on “denunciation, 
general deterrence, and retribution.”84  Moreover, she found only the weakest 
of rational connections between mandatory minimum sentences and general 
deterrence, although she agreed that such a connection did exist with respect 
to denunciation and retribution.85 Finally, imposing a mandatory minimum 
sentence for mere possession of firearms, rather than more closely connecting it 
to “conduct attracting significant moral blameworthiness,” violated the principle 
of minimal impairment of rights.86
In many respects, given the majority’s rejection of the sentencing principles 
undoubtedly embraced by the CPC government (denunciation, general 
deterrence, and retribution),87 Nur presents itself as a clear case of the Court’s 
repudiation of a recently-enacted core policy of the government. However, 
even Nur is more complicated than this. The Chief Justice did not reverse the 
sentences in the specific cases nor did she even declare mandatory minimum 
sentences unconstitutional per se (although she set a very high threshold for 
justifying them). Most obviously, unlike PHS, Carter, and Bedford, the Court was 
divided in Nur. Furthermore, the CPC government was not alone in defending 
the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum: Ontario defended the law as 
a party to the case, and British Columbia and Alberta intervened in favour of 
upholding its constitutionality. 
Both the overall picture and the specific circumstances of judicial 
invalidations under the Charter during the CPC government indicate a much 
more complex relationship between the Court and the government than can be 
captured through a simple “scorecard” of outcomes. Indeed, two of the losses that 
have contributed significantly to the narrative—Bedford and Carter—involved 
legislation passed by previous governments as well as reversals of the position 
taken by the Court itself in earlier judgments. Even the CPC government’s 
confrontational responses to PHS and Bedford were not unprecedented: Neither 
83. Ibid at para 43.
84. Ibid at para 44.
85. Ibid at para 115.
86. Ibid at para 117.
87. For a good analysis of the CPC government’s crime agenda under the Charter, see 
Kent Roach, “The Charter versus the Government’s Crime Agenda” (2012) 58:2 
Sup Ct L Rev 211.
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the PC nor LIB2 governments quietly deferred to the Court in a series of losses in 
the area of sexual assault, for example.88 To be sure, the book is not yet closed on 
the Court-CPC relationship, and future judgments—including those rendered 
after the CPC’s departure from government—may alter the picture in a manner 
more consistent with the “fractious relationship” narrative.89 Nevertheless, this set 
of evidence suggests that, at least for the moment, the narrative is exaggerated.
II. THE REFERENCE CASES
Bedford, PHS, Carter, and Nur represent the typical situation in which governments 
are pulled into constitutional litigation involuntarily. The same cannot be said of 
most reference cases, where governments seek to advance their policy agenda by 
extracting a favourable advisory opinion from the Court. The three occasions on 
which the CPC government sought advice from the Court through the reference 
procedure are hybrids that combine both involuntary and purposeful elements. In 
each instance, actions were launched or threatened by other parties, drawing the 
CPC government into a legal battle over which it sought to gain greater control 
by initiating its own process and framing its own questions; in each instance, 
the tactic was unsuccessful.90 In this section, I examine this distinctive set of 
cases, which are not included in the aggregate data presented in Part I, above, on 
judicial invalidations under the Charter. It is in these cases where the strongest 
argument for a particularly conflictual Court-government relationship lies.
At issue in the Securities Act Reference of 2011 was the CPC government’s 
proposal to implement an idea dating back to at least 2003 by establishing a 
88. For the legislative response to Seaboyer, see Bill C-49, An Act to amend the Criminal Code 
(trafficking in persons), 1st Sess, 38th Parl, 2004-2005 (assented to 25 November 2005), 
SC 2005, c 43. See also Bill C-46, An Act to amend the Corrections and Conditional Release 
Act and the Criminal Code, 1st Sess, 38th Parl, 2004-2005. Bill C-46 was the legislative 
response to R v O’Connor. See R v O’Connor, [1995] 4 SCR 411, 130 DLR (4th) 235. See 
also Criminal Code, supra note 62, s 33.1. This section was added in 1995 as a response 
to R v Daviault. See R v Daviault, [1994] 3 SCR 63, 118 DLR (4th) 469 [Daviault]. 
Kent Roach calls the response to Daviault an “in-your-face” response. See Kent Roach, 
The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 
2001) at 274-77.
89. The Minister of Justice’s mandate letter instructs her to “[r]eview [the government’s] 
litigation strategy,” which “should include early decisions to end appeals or positions that 
are not consistent with [the government’s] commitments, the Charter or [the government’s] 
values.” As a result, some cases that might have resulted in clear conflict between the Court 
and the CPC government may never reach the Court. See Mandate Letter, supra note 13.
90. Reference re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66, [2011] 3 SCR 837 [Securities Act Reference]; 
Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 2; Senate Reform Reference, supra note 3.
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single national securities regulator.91 Ontario—home to Canada’s largest securities 
market—supported the project, but Quebec, Alberta, and other provinces 
opposed it. The question posed to the Court under the reference procedure was 
whether the proposed Securities Act fell within the federal government’s legislative 
power to regulate trade and commerce. The federal government argued that the 
securities market had evolved from a provincial to a national matter, providing 
Parliament with legislative authority over all aspects of its regulation.92 The Court 
disagreed, finding that although “aspects of the securities market are national in 
scope and affect the country as a whole,” the proposed legislation mostly dealt 
with matters that had traditionally been recognized as falling within provincial 
legislative authority over property and civil rights within the province.93 
The Court therefore answered the reference question in the negative, advising the 
CPC government that it could not establish a national scheme to regulate the 
securities trade under a single regulatory body.
Although the Court expressed agnosticism with respect to “whether a single 
national securities scheme is preferable to multiple provincial regimes,”94 it did 
express a strong preference about how federalism should function. It urged “the 
federal government and the provinces to exercise their respective powers over 
securities harmoniously, in the spirit of cooperative federalism.”95 Consequently, 
the Court refused to signal which alternative scheme might be constitutional 
but did find it appropriate to “note the growing practice of resolving the 
complex governance problems that arise in federations … by seeking cooperative 
solutions that meet the needs of the country as a whole as well as its constituent 
parts.”96 According to the Court, the “federalism principle upon which Canada’s 
constitutional framework rests” demands nothing less than that cooperation be 
its “animating force.”97
The Securities Act Reference is thus as much an implicit critique of the CPC 
government’s style of intergovernmental relations as a repudiation of its preferred 
91. See Wise Persons’ Committee to Review the Structure of Securities Regulation in 
Canada, “It’s Time” (December 2003), online: <www.investorvoice.ca/Research/WPC_
Final_Dec03.pdf>.
92. Securities Act Reference, supra note 90 at para 4.
93. Ibid at para 6.
94. Ibid at para 10.
95. Ibid at para 9. 
96. Ibid at para 132.
97. Ibid at para 133.
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policy for regulating securities markets.98 Indeed, although there have been 
numerous federal-provincial-territorial meetings since 2006, the CPC government 
was known for its aversion to First Ministers’ meetings, holding only two during 
its term in power and none after 2009.99 Unlike PHS, where the Court had a 
strong opinion about the CPC government’s policy, it was largely indifferent 
to the substance of the proposal under review in the Securities Act Reference but 
clearly deeply concerned with how the federal government proposed to substitute 
a national regulatory regime for the existing local regimes. To be fair, it is arguable 
that this concern also extended to the provinces that intervened in the reference: 
The Court’s message to both was cooperation rather than confrontation.
If the level of conflict was relatively mild in the Securities Act Reference, the 
same cannot be said for the Supreme Court Act Reference or the Senate Reform 
Reference. At issue in the former was the eligibility of Federal Court judges for 
appointment to one of the three seats reserved for Quebec on the SCC. On 30 
September 30 2013, the Prime Minister announced the nomination of Justice 
Marc Nadon, a supernumerary (semi-retired) judge of the Federal Court of 
Appeal, to fill the Quebec seat vacated by the retirement of Justice Morris Fish.100 
First called to the Bar of Quebec in 1974, Nadon practised for almost twenty 
years in Quebec before being named to the trial division of the Federal Court 
by the PC government in 1993, from which he was elevated to the appellate 
division in 2001.101 Upon his appointment to the Federal Court, Nadon ceased 
to be a member of the Quebec bar. As a Federal Court judge without current 
membership in the Quebec bar, Nadon’s eligibility for appointment to one of the 
Quebec seats was uncertain.
The CPC government recognized the unconventionality of the appointment 
and sought expert opinions on Nadon’s eligibility for appointment from two 
former SCC justices (Ian Binnie and Louise Charron) and one of Canada’s most 
98. Others have noted that the opinion provides an interesting commentary on the Court’s 
understanding of the nature of Canadian federalism. See Gordon DiGiacomo, “The Supreme 
Court of Canada’s Federalism as Expressed in the Securities Reference” (2012) Institute of 
Intergovernmental Relations, School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, Working Paper 
No 2012-01, online: <www.queensu.ca/iigr/sites/webpublish.queensu.ca.iigrwww/files/files/
WorkingPapers/NewWorkingPapersSeries/WorkingPaper_01_2012_DiGiacomo.pdf>.
99. Robert Benzie, “Federal-provincial relations get little campaign traction,” Toronto 
Star (31 August 2015), online: <www.thestar.com/news/federal-election/2015/08/31/
federal-provincial-relations-get-little-campaign-traction.html>.
100. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 2 at para 9. 
101. Library of Parliament, Bill C-4: A second Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled 
in Parliament on March 21, 2013 and other measures (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2013) at 
27, n 74, online: <www.lop.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/LegislativeSummaries/41/2/c4-e.pdf>.
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respected and distinguished constitutionalists (Peter Hogg). All three delivered 
positive assessments of eligibility, and the formal process of appointment began 
on 2 October 2013. Five days later, Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin swore in 
Justice Nadon as a member of the Court, but on the same day, a Toronto lawyer 
launched a challenge to the appointment’s legality in the Federal Court.102 One day 
later, Justice Nadon announced he would not participate in any SCC proceedings 
while this challenge was underway. On 17 October, Quebec also announced 
that it would contest the appointment. On 22 October, the CPC government’s 
omnibus budget bill included amendments to the Supreme Court Act to clarify 
that Federal Court judges appointed from Quebec are eligible to fill Quebec 
vacancies, and it sent a reference to the SCC regarding the constitutionality of 
these amendments and Nadon’s appointment itself.103
The Court heard oral arguments in the Supreme Court Act Reference on 15 
January 2014 and delivered its judgment on 21 March. In its six-to-one decision, 
the Court answered both questions posed to it by the CPC government in the 
negative, rejecting both the government’s interpretation of the Supreme Court Act 
and assertion of legislative authority to amend the act to make it clear that former 
members of the bar, including the Quebec bar, are eligible for appointment.104 
At issue on the first question was the relationship between sections 5 and 6 of 
the Supreme Court Act. Section 5 specifies the requirement that anyone can be 
appointed to the Court who is or has been a member of a provincial superior 
court or a member of a provincial bar for at least ten years. Section 6 specifies 
that at least three of the Court’s judges “shall be appointed from among the 
judges of the Court of Appeal or of the Superior Court of the Province of Québec 
102. Canadian Press, “Marc Nadon’s failed journey to the Supreme Court,” CBC News (8 May 
2014), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/marc-nadon-s-failed-journey-to-the-supreme- 
court-1.2636403>.
103. Ibid. Two unanswered questions about this sequence of events are why Justice Nadon 
voluntarily abstained from taking up the position to which he had been duly sworn and 
why the government took the legislative and legal action it did. One can imagine a scenario 
in which Justice Nadon took his seat on the Court and began hearing, and deciding, 
cases during the period that both the private and reference challenges to his appointment 
worked their way through the judicial system. In this circumstance, judicial invalidation 
of his appointment would have thrown into doubt the results of any case in which he had 
participated. With this possibility in mind, would any court have been willing to invalidate 
the appointment?
104. Justice Moldaver dissented. He agreed with the CPC government’s interpretation of sections 
5 and 6 and therefore found it unnecessary to decide whether the amendments were 
legitimate (as they were redundant given his answer to the first question).
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or from among the advocates of that Province.”105 The Court determined that 
section 5 establishes a minimal threshold for eligibility and that section 6 creates 
an additional requirement of current membership for eligibility for the Quebec 
seats. Consequently, although section 6 does not specify a minimum length of 
membership in the Quebec bar, the majority held that the threshold of ten years’ 
membership established in section 5 also applies to the Quebec seats. The Court 
thus declared that Federal Court judges, including Justice Nadon, are ineligible 
for appointment to one of the Court’s Quebec seats.
This result was a clear defeat for the CPC government, but the Court’s 
treatment of the second reference question is perhaps more important. The 
government passed amendments to both sections 5 and 6 designed to clarify that 
past membership in a provincial bar for ten years, including for the Quebec seats, 
satisfies the eligibility requirement.106 The question here was whether Parliament 
could effect this change through ordinary statute or whether it required a 
constitutional amendment. The Constitution Act, 1867 did not establish the 
constitutional requirement for a general court of appeal for Canada, rather it only 
established Parliament’s authority to create such an institution. However, despite 
not changing this feature of the Constitution Act, 1867, the Constitution Act, 1982 
included the Court’s composition and other essential features as matters covered 
by the unanimity and 7/50 rules,107 respectively, for amending the constitution. 
The Court took the view that the amendments to sections 5 and 6 of the Supreme 
Court Act affected the Court’s composition and could therefore only be achieved 
through a constitutional amendment ratified unanimously by the federal and 
provincial governments.108
The Court thus took advantage of this unexpected opportunity to confer 
upon itself a constitutional status it had never before enjoyed. If neither its 
composition nor other essential features can be changed except by constitutional 
amendment, then the existence of a general court of appeal for Canada is no 
longer a Parliamentary option, as anticipated by section 101 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867, but a constitutional necessity. The outcome in the Supreme Court Act 
105. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 2 at para 12.
106. There was some ambiguity in section 5, which recognized past membership of a superior 
court more explicitly than past membership of a provincial bar. The clarifying amendment 
for section 5 was ultimately unnecessary, as the Court resolved this ambiguity in favour of 
past membership in both sets of institutions. See ibid at paras 28-34. 
107. The 7/50 formula stipulates that amendments may be enacted through resolutions of the 
Senate and House of Commons and the legislative assemblies of two-thirds of the provinces 
representing at least 50 per cent of the population.
108. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 2 at paras 104-05.
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Reference both blocked an action important to the CPC government and served 
the Court’s long-term institutional interests. In this sense, the Supreme Court 
Act Reference represents a perfect strategic victory for the Court relative to the 
government: The decision maximized both the Court’s short-term policy interest 
in influencing appointments to the Court and its long-term institutional power 
and prestige. Perhaps no case better illustrates the Court’s status as a political 
rather than legal institution.109
Slightly more than a month later, the Court issued its unanimous opinion in 
the Senate Reform Reference. The CPC government launched this reference after 
Quebec announced that it was submitting a reference to the Quebec Court of 
Appeal concerning Bill C-7,110 through which the CPC government hoped to 
achieve certain reforms to the Senate.111 The bill proposed to reform the Senate 
in two ways: (1) by providing an electoral framework, adopted by provinces 
and territories at their own discretion, to generate a list of nominees that must 
be considered by the Prime Minister in recommending Senate nominees to 
the Governor General; and (2) by changing the tenure of Senators to a single, 
non-renewable fixed term of nine years. The government asserted that the first 
reform could be achieved through ordinary legislation but recognized that the 
second required an amendment to section 29(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
However, the government further asserted that this constitutional change fell 
within the unilateral amending authority of Parliament under section 44 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982.112
Three principal objections were raised to Bill C-7: (1) that it would 
undermine the Senate’s independence, (2) that it would change the method 
of selecting Senators by transferring authority from the Prime Minister to the 
electorate, and (3) that it would affect the Senate’s powers by fundamentally 
altering its essential representational characteristics. According to this argument, 
109. I have discussed this characteristic of the Court and its strategic relationship to governments. 
See Christopher P Manfredi, “Strategic Behaviour and the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms” in Patrick James, Donald E Abelson & Michael Lusztig, eds, The Myth of 
the Sacred: The Charter, the Courts, and the Politics of the Constitution in Canada (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002) 147.
110. An Act respecting the selection of senators and amending the Constitution Act, 1867 in respect of 
Senate term limits, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2011.
111. Senate Reform Reference, supra note 3 at paras 10-12. Readers should note that I prepared an 
expert opinion for the Government of Canada in the Quebec reference case, which Canada 
also filed as part of its evidence in the Supreme Court Act Reference.
112. Senate Reform Reference, supra note 3 at para 72. This path to constitutional amendment 
applies to matters relating to executive government of Canada or the Senate and 
House of Commons. 
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these aspects of Bill C-7 would, in the aggregate, have profound effects on the 
fundamental features or essential characteristics of the Senate. Consequently, all 
of the changes contained in Bill C-7 would require constitutional amendment 
according to the more stringent rules of unanimity or the 7/50 formula. The 
reference questions posed by Quebec to its Court of Appeal were specifically 
directed at Bill C-7, which the Court of Appeal held in October 2013 could only 
be enacted through constitutional amendment according to the 7/50 amending 
rule.113 The SCC Senate Reform Reference, for which oral arguments took place in 
November 2013, dealt with a more extensive set of questions that went beyond 
the specific provisions of Bill C-7, including questions about how the Senate 
might be abolished. Like the Quebec Court of Appeal, the SCC held that most 
of the proposed changes to the Senate could only be achieved through the 7/50 
procedure and that abolition would require unanimous consent of the provinces. 
Only the net worth eligibility requirement for appointment could be enacted 
through the federal government’s unilateral amending power.114
The Court reached this opinion largely on the grounds that the Constitution 
should be understood as a comprehensive structure, with a particular architecture 
that is greater than the sum of its “discrete textual provisions.”115 In the Court’s 
view, consultative elections would fundamentally change the Constitution’s 
architecture and thus require approval through the 7/50 amending formula.116 
Similarly, the Court held that the Senate is a core element of this architecture 
and that changes to senatorial tenure would affect the fundamental nature of this 
core element. Consequently, this change engages the interests of the provinces 
and cannot be achieved without their consent.117
113. Ibid at paras 10-11.
114. Ibid at para 86.
115. Ibid at para 27. 
116. Ibid at paras 54-67.
117. Ibid at paras 71-83. This is not the place to engage in a full-scale analysis of the Court’s 
conceptual, historical, and empirical reasoning in the Senate Reform Reference. For my 
research and conclusion on these matters, see Christopher Manfredi, “Expert Opinion on 
the Possible Effects of Bill C-7, An Act respecting the election of Senators and amending the 
Constitution Act, 1867 in respect of Senate term limits” (June 2013) [on file with author] 
(filed by the Government of Canada in the Quebec Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court 
of Canada). One thing worth noting is the Court’s relative lack of engagement with the 
numerous expert reports submitted by both sides in the proceedings. To be sure, the Court 
cited several scholarly studies of the Senate and the amending procedure, but only two of 
those studies spoke directly to the substance of Bill C-7. Perhaps the Court determined that 
the content of those expert reports was adequately communicated in the parties’ facta and 
oral arguments.
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The Supreme Court Reference and the Senate Reform Reference both negated 
initiatives of high importance to the CPC government, although the impact 
of the second will endure longer. While the government failed to appoint its 
first choice to the Court, by early June 2014, it had named a replacement for 
Justice Nadon (Justice Clement Gascon), and six months later it made a second 
appointment, Suzanne Coté, from the ranks of the Quebec bar. Senate reform 
subsequently appeared to fall very low on the government’s agenda, and the Prime 
Minister simply ceased to recommend appointments to the upper house.118 Not 
surprisingly, the absence of action in filling vacant seats became the subject of 
litigation filed in the Federal Court, setting up the potential for another direct 
confrontation between the government and the SCC, albeit after the government 
is out of office.119
III. ABORIGINAL TITLE AND THE LONG-GUN REGISTRY
Among the judgments frequently cited in support of the narrative that the CPC 
government faced a particularly oppositional SCC is Tsilhqot’in Nation v British 
Columbia of 2014.120 At issue was the Tsilhqot’in First Nation’s claim to Aboriginal 
title over an area of central British Columbia. In another unanimous judgment 
authored by the Chief Justice, the Court clarified its existing jurisprudence under 
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and found that Aboriginal title “flows 
from occupation in the sense of regular and exclusive use of land,” “confers the 
right to use and control the land and to reap the benefits flowing from it,” and, 
once established, prohibits Crown incursions on the land without the consent of 
118. In late July 2015, Prime Minister Harper announced a moratorium on Senate appointments. 
See Steven Chase, “Stephen Harper vows not to make any Senate appointments,” The 
Globe and Mail (24 July 2015), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/
harper-wall-to-call-for-abolition-of-senate-on-friday-report/article25658737>.
119. Alani v Canada (Prime Minister), 2015 FC 649, [2015] FCJ No 636. Readers should note 
that I prepared an expert opinion in this case for the Government of Canada. On request of 
the applicant, without objection by the Government of Canada, the hearing scheduled in 
this case for 9–10 December 2015 was postponed pending the outcome of the Government’s 
appeal of a decision not to dismiss the application. The applicant also indicated that he might 
reconsider the utility of proceeding with the application, depending on progress by the new 
government in implementing reforms to the Senate appointment process. See Aniz Alani, 
“Federal Court hearing of Senate Vacancies judicial review postponed pending outcome of 
Government appeal” (10 November 2015), online: <www.anizalani.com/senatevacancies/
federal-court-hearing-of-senate-vacancies-judicial-review-postponed-pending-outcome-of-
government-appeal>.
120. 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 SCR 257 [Tsilhqot’in].
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the Aboriginal group holding the title (unless the incursion passes a demanding 
test for justified infringement of aboriginal title).121 In this instance, the Court 
found that the Tsilhqot’in First Nation did indeed possess Aboriginal title and 
that British Columbia had acted in a manner inconsistent with its obligations to 
the Tsilhqot’in.
From the perspective of the CPC government, the Tsilhqot’in judgment 
established an obviously unwanted obstacle to its objective of authorizing 
the Northern Gateway pipeline to transport oil from Alberta to the British 
Columbia coast. Beyond that, however, it is difficult to characterize the judgment 
as specifically targeting the CPC government. To begin with, the primary 
target of the Tsilhqot’in Nation’s original claim was the government of British 
Columbia; the government of Canada was a secondary respondent. Second, 
the litigation that eventually produced the judgment began in 2002, during the 
LIB2 government, and involved a 339-day trial spread over five years.122 The 
Tsilhqot’in won a partial victory at trial, which the BC Court of Appeal reversed. 
The Tsilhqot’in people were thus appealing that loss to the SCC; this was not 
a case of an intransigent government seeking to reverse rights unambiguously 
granted throughout lower court proceedings. Finally, to accept Tsilhqot’in as a 
judgment especially targeted against the CPC government, it is necessary that 
one or both of two counterfactuals be true: first, that another federal government 
would have conceded the case or defended Crown title and regulatory authority 
less vigorously, or second, that the Court would have reached a different 
conclusion had the CPC government not been in power. Although the Court 
was undoubtedly aware of the political and policy context of the dispute, there is 
little evidence that the CPC government took a more aggressive position or fared 
worse in Tsilhqot’in than any other federal government would have.123
The “CPC government versus the Court” narrative is further blunted by 
an important federalism decision in March 2015: Quebec (Attorney General) v 
Canada (Attorney General).124 At issue was the constitutionality of a key element 
of the CPC government’s removal of long-gun registration requirements. The 
long-gun registry had been an integral part of the 1995 LIB2 government’s 
Firearms Act, and its abolition was a key element of the CPC’s policy platform.125 
121. Ibid at para 2.
122. Ibid at para 7.
123. It might also be noted that in 2011, the Court unanimously rejected an Aboriginal 
title claim. See Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 56, 
[2011] 3 SCR 535.
124. 2015 SCC 14, [2015] 1 SCR 693 [Quebec].
125. Ibid at para 5. 
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In 2012, shortly after winning a majority, the CPC government enacted the 
Ending the Long-gun Registry Act, which repealed the registry requirement for 
long guns, decriminalized the possession of unregistered long guns, and required 
the destruction of all records contained in the registry with respect to long 
guns.126 Quebec, which intended to establish its own registry, sought to prevent 
destruction of the data connected to the province. Quebec prevailed in the 
Quebec Superior Court, lost in the Quebec Court of Appeal, and appealed to the 
SCC.127 Its argument was that the concept of “cooperative federalism” limited the 
exercise of the federal Parliament’s exclusive constitutional jurisdiction.
The decision was a narrow one—five-to-four—but the majority judgment, 
which included the Chief Justice in this instance, found the destruction of the 
data to be within Parliament’s constitutional authority over criminal law and 
unaffected by the principle of cooperative federalism. Finding that the data’s 
existence flowed exclusively from the federal Parliament’s criminal law power 
and that the principle of cooperative federalism cannot limit the scope of that 
power, the majority upheld the Quebec Court of Appeal’s decision that Quebec 
had no right to the data.128 Like Nur (discussed in Part I, above), the long-gun 
registry case brought the Court into direct contact with the CPC government’s 
legislative agenda. That the Court, however narrowly, deferred to that agenda 
in this instance suggests a more nuanced approach to understanding the 
Court-government relationship. Indeed, of the 18 total votes cast in these two 
judgments from the spring of 2015, 8 were cast in favour of the government 
while 10 went against it. This suggests neither strong affirmation nor repudiation 
of the CPC government’s agenda.129 
IV. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been to bring greater analytical rigour to a 
narrative, common among both popular and academic commentaries, that there 
126. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Firearms Act, SC 2012, c 6.
127. Quebec, supra note 124 at paras 9-14. 
128. Ibid at paras 23-25.
129. However, it is intriguing that the majority judgment in the long-gun registry case takes up 
only 46 of the complete 203-paragraph judgment and that the dissent is much more detailed 
with respect to background and lower court proceedings. This often indicates, especially in 
five-to-four outcomes, that a dissent began as the majority judgment but lost the support of 
at least one justice along the way. This, in turn, raises the possibility of strategic deference. 
See Peter McCormick, “Standing Apart: Separate Concurrence and the Modern Supreme 
Court of Canada, 1984-2006” (2008) 53:1 McGill LJ 137.  
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was a particularly antagonistic relationship between the CPC government and the 
SCC. The narrative stems from a series of high-profile losses by the government 
in constitutional cases, as well as the government’s and Prime Minister’s reaction 
to those decisions. In some versions of the narrative, these losses suggest that 
the Court became an explicitly, and even self-consciously, oppositional force 
against the CPC government’s “extremist” policies. In other versions of the 
narrative, especially in the aftermath of the Nadon appointment controversy, it 
was a personal conflict between Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Chief Justice 
Beverly McLachlin.130
In order to explore this narrative analytically, the article closely examined 
three types of cases: instances of judicial invalidation under the Charter, key 
reference opinions, and two cases involving Aboriginal rights and the long-gun 
registry. One key finding is that it is difficult to draw a direct line from losses 
in Charter cases to any particular relationship between the government and the 
Court. In 75 per cent of the CPC’s Charter losses, the policy invalidated by the 
Court belonged to a predecessor government.131 Indeed, as defender or enactor, 
the CPC’s record in Charter cases did not differ significantly from that of the 
two other post-Charter governments. Even the Tsilhqot’in judgment was not 
necessarily a clear strike against the CPC government: British Columbia was 
the principal respondent, and the LIB2 government was initially responsible 
for making the federal argument against title in the case. By contrast, the three 
reference cases initiated by the CPC government offer a clearer portrait of 
confrontation, since in all three cases the Court blocked initiatives considered 
important by the government. However, the Court provided a clear, if narrow, 
victory to the CPC government in the long-gun registry case.
Like all analyses, this one has limitations. One is that the article has not 
attempted to examine whether the CPC government significantly changed 
litigation strategies and arguments in the cases it inherited from previous 
governments. This is an interesting avenue for further research, but it would 
also require undertaking an overall evaluation of how all governments approach 
inherited litigation to determine whether one government’s approach is 
unique in some way.
130. There is some irony in this given that there was at least one moment, in 2004, when Beverley 
McLachlin and Stephen Harper were of the same mind on an important constitutional issue. 
For an example of the Chief Justice writing a dissenting judgment that essentially agreed with 
the position advocated by Harper with respect to third-party election advertising, see Harper 
v Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 33, [2004] 1 SCR 827.
131. See Table 1 in Part I, above. 
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Perhaps the most interesting development since 2006 was the adoption of 
a more consistently confrontational approach by the CPC government in its 
legislative responses compared to its predecessors. This occurred even in cases like 
PHS and Bedford, where the invalidated legislation or policy did not originate 
with the CPC government. Although other governments also refused to defer 
completely to the Court in certain areas, defiance appeared to emerge as the 
norm under the CPC government. In this sense, the CPC government may have 
been asserting an equal authority to interpret the Constitution’s meaning, which 
could have brought it into much sharper conflict with the Court had it not lost 
the 2015 federal election.
V. APPENDIX
In constructing the data set, the author is particularly grateful for earlier work 
by James B. Kelly, especially in Governing with the Charter and his subsequent 
updates to these data.132 Dennis Baker at the University of Guelph also provided 
assistance in constructing the data set. However, any errors in the data set are mine.
132. James B Kelly, Governing with the Charter: Legislative and Judicial Activism and Framers’ Intent 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) at 145-47. Reproduced with permission.
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TABLE 2: CHARTER NULLIFICATION OF EDERAL STATUTES, 1984-2015
Case
Year of 
Enactment or 
Amendment
Enacting or 
Amending 
Government
Year 
Nullified
Government 
When 
Nullified
1 Hunter HIST 1984 PC
2 Singh 1976 LIB1 1985 PC
3 Big M Drug Mart HIST 1985 PC
4 Oakes HIST 1986 PC
5 Smith HIST 1987 PC
6 Vaillancourt 1976 LIB1 1987 PC
7 Morgentaler 1970 LIB1 1988 PC
8 Martineau HIST 1990 PC
9 Logan HIST 1990 PC
10 Nguyen HIST 1990 PC
11 Swain HIST 1991 PC
12 Seaboyer 1983 LIB1 1991 PC
13 Sit 1983 LIB1 1991 PC
14 Comm for Common-
wealth of Canada
1979 LIB1 1991 PC
15 Osborne 1970 LIB1 1991 PC
16 Tetrault-Gadoury 1971 LIB1 1991 PC
17 Bain HIST 1992 PC
18 Zundel HIST 1992 PC
19 Généreux HIST 1992 PC
20 Morales 1970 LIB1 1992 PC
21 Schacter 1980 LIB1 1992 PC
22 Baron; Kourtesi 1986 PC 1993 PC
23 Sauvé (1) HIST 1993 PC
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TABLE 2: CHARTER NULLIFICATION OF EDERAL STATUTES, 1984-2015
Case
Year of 
Enactment or 
Amendment
Enacting or 
Amending 
Government
Year 
Nullified
Government 
When 
Nullified
24 Heywood HIST 1994 LIB2
25 Laba HIST 1994 LIB2
26 RJR-Macdonald 1988 PC 1995 LIB2
27 Benner 1976 LIB1 1997 LIB2
28 Thomson Newspaper Co 1985 PC 1998 LIB2
29 Lucas HIST 1998 LIB2
30 Corbière HIST 1999 LIB2
31 Burns 1999 LIB2 2001 LIB2
32 Ruzic HIST 2001 LIB2
33 Sharpe 1993 PC 2001 LIB2
34 Hall 1997 LIB2 2002 LIB2
35 White, Ottenheimer & 
Baker
HIST 2002 LIB2
36 Little Sisters HIST 2002 LIB2
37 Ruby 1983 LIB1 2002 LIB2
38 Sauvé (2) 1993 PC 2002 LIB2
39 Figueroa 1993 PC 2003 LIB2
40 Demers HIST 2004 LIB2
41 Hislop 2000 LIB2 2007 CPC
42 Charkaoui 2001 LIB2 2007 CPC
43 DB 2002 LIB2 2008 CPC
44 PHS 1996 (2008) LIB2 (CPC) 2011 CPC*
45 TSE 1993 PC 2012 CPC
46 St-Onge Lamoureux 2008 CPC 2012 CPC
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TABLE 2: CHARTER NULLIFICATION OF EDERAL STATUTES, 1984-2015
Case
Year of 
Enactment or 
Amendment
Enacting or 
Amending 
Government
Year 
Nullified
Government 
When 
Nullified
47 Bedford HIST 2013 CPC
48 Carter HIST 2015 CPC
49 Federation of Law 
Societies of Canada
2000 LIB2 2015 CPC
50 MPAO 1988/2003** PC/LIB2 2015 CPC
51 Nur 2012 CPC 2015 CPC
52 Smith 1996*** LIB2 2015 CPC
* In PHS, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, enacted by the LIB2 
government, but nullified the specific use of ministerial discretion by the CPC government 
under the statute.
** At issue in MPAO were regulations enacted under the PC government and a version of a 
statute enacted under the LIB2 government.
*** In Smith, the Court did not strike down the impugned provisions in their entirety but only 
to “the extent that they prohibit a person with a medical authorization from possessing 
cannabis derivatives for medical purposes.”133
133
133. R v Smith, 2015 SCC 34 at para 31, [2015] 2 SCR 602.

